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n Dr Seuss’s story, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’1 the protagonist2 
confronts a pair of levitating green trousers in a dark wood at night. 
In spite of the fact that this is a rather strange situation in which to 
find oneself, and that this other being is completely unknown to her, 
our heroine - I shall henceforth refer to her as Everyperson - 
immediately reacts as if these pants were behaving in accordance with 
some sort of purpose or intention. This is evident in her account of the 
situation: 
 
I wasn’t scared. But, yet, I stopped. 
What could those pants be there for? 
What could a pair of pants at night 
Be standing in the air for?3  
 
Although this account seems absurd because it takes the novelty of the 
situation for granted, what Everyperson is doing is something which 
most of us have engaged in at some time in our lives: interpreting the 
behaviour of another being as if that being possessed beliefs and 
intentions. In other words, Everyperson adopts what is sometimes 
called the ‘Intentional Stance’4 towards the pants (which shall be known 
henceforth as GP - short for Green Pants). As Dr Seuss’s tale unfolds, 
Everyperson is able to determine, to what degree of precision it remains 
unclear, the intentions of GP through acts of communication - most 
importantly, verbal language. Everyperson and GP thereby become 
                                                          
1 Dr. Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ in The Sneetches and Other Stories (William Collins 
Sons & Co, London, 1961).  
2 Although the protagonist is a hare-like creature (i.e. a non-human animal), Seuss 
expects us to unproblematically identify with her as an intentional being. For the 
purposes of this article, I will adopt the intentional stance toward this protagonist.  
3 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ - original emphasis 
4 This phrase was made famous by Daniel Dennett in his book of the same name, in 





friendly acquaintances and engage with each other without further 
problems. 
In real life, such a situation would not be so clear cut. Philosophers and 
scientists alike have realised that there are many problems in attributing 
beliefs and intentions to other beings. For instance, even if we allow that 
Everyperson’s initial judgement had been confirmed by the end of the 
tale, most of us would agree that her immediate attribution of 
intentionality to the pants was an intuitive reaction, based on little direct 
evidence of the presence of beliefs or intentions. 
 
At this point we might ask, ‘Well then, what is intentionality? and 
where do beliefs and desires fit into this picture?’ My task in Part I of 
this article is to answer these questions. I will show that the common 
assumptions regarding intentionality tend to lead to more stringent 
conditions for intentionality in relation to non-human animals than to 
humans. The impact of such a double-standard on our perception of 
non-human animal intentionality has been enormous. However, I will 
leave the question of whether or not this is a tenable position aside for 
the greater part of this article, and focus on the alleged problems of 
attributing beliefs and intentions to all non-human animals, as this has 
been the main focus of the current philosophical debate about 
intentionality. 
 
I will discuss the nature of intentionality as it is attributed to non-
human animals in Part II, along with the assumptions inherent in our 
views of what constitutes evidence for such. This leads to a discussion of 
the issue of anthropomorphism in Part III. 
 
In Part IV I will discuss the main issues pertaining to language as an 
indication that a being is intentional. I will examine arguments such as 
those of Regan and Stich, in which the issue of anthropocentrism, in 
relation to the language debate, is highlighted. 
 
In Part V I will discuss a popular alternative to the intentional stance - 
animal behaviourism - which appears to have been adopted by 
cognitive ethologists everywhere. Just as it was shown to be a very 
narrow and problematic approach to human psychology some decades 
ago, I will argue that behaviourism is equally inapplicable to non-
human animals. 
 
I will relate the issue of attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human 
animals to the important ethical issues which are at stake in the question 
of non-human intentionality in Part VI. 
 




In conclusion, I will re-evaluate Everyperson’s position in the light of 
this discussion. My own intention is to show that those problems in 
attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human animals, and indeed 
other unclassified beings such as GP, which cannot be avoided through 







The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting 
 the behaviour of an entity (person, animal, 
 artefact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a 
 rational agent who governed its “choice” of “action” 
 by a “consideration” of its “beliefs” and “desires”. 5 
 
Adopting the intentional stance towards a given being entails assuming 
that the behaviour of this being can be explained and understood in 
terms of its beliefs, desires and intentions, that is, what it thinks and feels. 
An example of an intentional explanation would therefore be: ‘the cat is 
scratching on the kitchen cupboard because he thinks the cat food is in 
there’. Copeland contrasts intentional explanations, which refer to mind 
states, with explanations which refer to brain states, such as 
‘explanations of behaviour that are couched directly in terms of 
electrical activity in the agent’s cortex’.6 Intentional explanations, then, 
focus on the content of the mind - primarily, beliefs and desires - which 
are assumed to play some sort of causal role in relation to the behaviour 
of living beings. In order to explain this role, it is important to say a 
word about beliefs and desires themselves. 
 
Beliefs and desires are intentional because they are ‘about’ something - 
they exist in virtue of the fact that they have some sort of 
representational content. Thus, I do not just have beliefs - I have a belief 
that my friend is downstairs, or a desire to see my friend. We can therefore 
say that beliefs and desires exhibit intentionality because they are 
extensive. When we adopt the intentional stance, we assume that 
behaviour is motivated by the interaction between a desire and one or 
more congruent beliefs. Thus my behaviour of going downstairs and 
saying hello to my friend Taliessin could be said to be indicative of my 
                                                          
5 D.C. Dennett, Kinds of Minds (Phoenix, London, 1996), p.35.  
6 B.J. Copeland, Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction (Basil Blackwell, 




belief that Taliessin is downstairs, coupled with my desire to see her. 
Similarly, an intentional explanation of the behaviour of a polar bear 
might be that ‘the bear is pounding on the ice above the den of a seal 
because it has the belief that a seal is under the ice, and the desire to eat 
that seal’. We derive the animal’s intentions from its (apparent) beliefs 
and desires.  
 
Such conclusions regarding intentions are likely to be based on the 
premise that the being in question, whether human or not, is aware of 
what it is doing and why: that it is conscious. Consciousness, like beliefs, 
is intentional, and thus one must be conscious of something.  
 
Some philosophers (such as Dennett7 and Carruthers8) have argued that 
an additional type of belief exists, without which an intentional being 
cannot be said to be conscious. This is known as a ‘second-order belief’, 
which is simply a belief that I believe such and such..9 To be conscious, 
argue these philosophers, a being must apply the belief that it has beliefs 
to its beliefs of everything else, otherwise the consciousness has no 
object. Second-order beliefs are much more abstract entities than 
‘ordinary’ beliefs, and they are less likely to be manifested in behaviour 
other than verbal. It is impossible to say whether or not non-human 
animals possess such beliefs at all. Carruthers and others emphatically 
deny such beliefs to non-human animals without being able to prove or 
disprove such claims.  
 
It is ultimately the issue of consciousness of non-human animals that is 
at stake in the various debates about intentionality, and which has thus 
rendered the attribution of intentionality to non-human animals 
problematic. But besides these controversial issues, the intentional 







One of the major problems in attributing intentionality to non-human 
animals is the nature of the intentional stance which most of us tend to 
                                                          
7 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’ 
8 P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) 
9 This explanation of second-order belief is paraphrased from Carruthers, ‘The Animals 
Issue’, p.178.  
10 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.35.  
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adopt. As Dennett has pointed out on numerous occasions, inherent in 
this stance is the assumption that the being towards which we adopt 
this stance is a rational being, whose beliefs and desires are accurately 
reflected in, and 
verifiable through observation of, their behaviour.11  
 
There are a considerable number of problems with such a stance. The 
first is that the assumption of rationality is based on a secondary 
assumption that the being in question will always reason to act in favour 
of its own best interests, and thus that he/she knows what these are. This 
is quite a stringent condition to apply to non-human animals, because 
we cannot even say this of human beings, particularly young children or 
the mentally ill. There is a tendency to fail to allow for the possibility 
that non-human animals can, at times, be irrational - just like humans. 
This attitude is obvious in David Attenborough’s explanation of polar 
bear behaviour in the documentary Polar Bear.12 Two young bears 
engage in what appears to be aggressive behaviour, without doing 
serious physical harm to one another. Attenborough explains that that 
the polar bears are engaging in play fighting to prepare for their lives as 
adult male bears, as if the bears desire to be strong adult bears, and believe 
that ‘play-fighting’ will make them so. This explanation overlooks other 
possibilities, such as  the possibility that the bears may be engaging in 
this activity for no other reason than that they enjoy doing so. 
 
The reason for this oversight is that the assumption of rationality 
usually leads to plausible explanations.  Should we  fail to take 
rationality as a starting point, it would be an almost impossible task to 
predict the most likely course of action of an intentional being. The 
problem is that when non-rational or irrational behaviour appears 
rational from an external point of view, the explanation which is 
derived may fit the situation whilst simultaneously failing to reflect the 
beliefs and desires behind the action.13  
 
Alternatively, we may mistake the ‘rational’ behaviour of animals for 
irrational behaviour. Dennett gives the following example of a frog 
which swallows a baited fishing line: 
 
                                                          
11 See especially D.C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987). 
12 D. Attenborough, Polar Bear , Produced by Martha Holmes and Keith Schole for BBC 
Worldwide, Ltd., Sydney: ABC Video.  
13 We are not freed from this dilemma automatically if we assume rationality whilst 
granting that we are sometimes wrong in this assumption, for we have to be able to 
recognise situations in which the agent is not or has not been rational. This brings us 




The frog has made a mistake, but exactly which 
 mistake(s) has it made? What did the frog “think” 
 it was grabbing? A fly? Airborne food? A moving 
 dark convexity? We language users can draw 
 indefinitely fine distinctions of content from the 
 candidate frog-thought.14  
 
Adopting the intentional stance, we therefore run the risk of grossly 
misinterpreting the behaviour of non-human animals, and with it 
attributing imprecise or incorrect beliefs and intentions. This error can 
occur in varied cases. In Dennett's example, it occurs due to the 
imprecision with which we ascribe particular intentions to a non-human 
animal. Error may also occur in relation to the degree of precision with 
which we isolate a behaviour which warrants an interpretation. 
 
Thus another problem with adopting the intentional stance is that we 
tend to apply the intentional stance to the whole of the non-human 
animal's behaviour, assuming a rational explanation for all of it. This 
approach allows no room for the errors which non-human animals 
make, such as choosing an impractical location to build a nest, or 
wandering off and being unable to find a way back to a community or 
colony. We simply explain these as if the animals behaviour is an 
accurate reflection of its belief-desire, and that we are interpreting it 
correctly. 
 
In fact, in the case of non-human animals, the only way we measure the 
‘truth’ of an intentional account is against the standard of rationality: if 
the explanation is reasonable and fits the picture, it is very likely to be 
taken as an accurate and adequate explanation. This is problematic 
because, as I have shown in this section, a rational explanation may not 
give an accurate account of the beliefs and desires held by non-human 
animals. Moreover, many rational explanations are available for the one 








Here we expose the underlying anthropomorphism 
of the intentional stance: we treat all intentional 
systems as if they were just like us - which of course 
                                                          
14 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.51. 
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they are not.15  
 
Fortunately for GP, GP’s beliefs and desires were of such a nature that 
Everyperson’s interpretive strategies culminated in a more-or-less 
accurate view (once corrected) of what GP’s behaviour was really 
signalling. Everyperson simply based her interpretation on the 
assumption that GP was just like herself. 
 
Anthropomorphism is a problem which arises because the intentional 
stance is a strategy for interpreting behaviour, and is necessarily applied 
from a point of view. Thus the attribution of intentionality is subject to 
the limits of the interpreter. Nagel illustrates this view in his essay, 
‘What is it like to be a bat?,’ in which he argues that ‘the subjective 
character of experience...is not analysable in terms of any explanatory 
system of functional states, or intentional states’.16 He emphasises the 
fact that there are elements of subjective experience which are 
inaccessible to observers. The implication is that these elements may 
constitute data which are fed back into the mind, undetectably 
influencing behaviour. Thus we can have a case where, in what we 
perceive to be the exact same set of circumstances and environment, an 
immeasurable qualitative difference may cause a being to interpret the 
context in a different way. 
 
Nagel’s essay is typically assumed to be a polemic against 
anthropomorphism. Nagel does indeed argue against the practice of 
assuming that we can know everything about the experience of another 
creature (and therefore whether or not to attribute beliefs and intentions 
to a particular creature). But if we take Nagel’s argument in the 
strongest sense,17 the implication is that human experience is so 
different to the experience of non-human animals that we cannot 
possibly gather the evidence required to attribute intentions and beliefs 
to them. If we accept this conclusion, there is no reason to attribute 
beliefs and intentions to non-human animals in the first place, as even if 
we did, their beliefs and intentions may be so different to those which 
we understand that we are no closer to understanding non-human 
animals than we were in the first place. In other words, Nagel’s stance 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p.43. 
16 T. Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ in The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self 
and Soul, composed and arranged by D.R. Hofstadter and D.C.Dennett (Penguin, 
Hammondsworth, 1981).  
17 As for instance Dennett has done. See Kinds of Minds in particular for such an 




can lead to an anthropocentric18 position in regard to beliefs and 
intentions. 
 
If we reject anthropomorphism altogether, this may lead to the attitude 
that not only does it render an interpretation of non-human animal 
behaviour unscientific, but that the fruits of an interpretation tainted 
with this bias are wrong. This can lead to the situation which Dennett 
describes in Kinds of Minds: 
 
So where we recognise that much of what we 
think of the awfulness of pain...involves 
imagining...anthropomorphic accompaniments, 
we generously decide that they are just  
accompaniments, not “essential” to the brute 
phenomenon of sentience.19   
 
Dennett’s remark brings to our attention the fact that the conclusion that 
anthropomorphic interpretations are wrong does not follow from the 
premise that such interpretations can be incorrect or inaccurate. We must 
be careful not to jump to conclusions in either direction if we are really 
to be faithful to a scientific approach. We should not dismiss the fact 
that ‘anthropomorphic interpretations’ often appear to explain the beliefs 
and intentions of non-human animal behaviour adequately, and 
certainly allow us to predict their behaviour much of the time. 
 
Furthermore, if we hold that humans evolved from a non-human 
ancestry, we must accept that we will be similar to non-human animals 
in a number of determined as well as a number of as yet undetermined 
ways. Apparently ‘anthropomorphic’ explanations may be closer to the 
truth than some would argue. To dismiss them would therefore be a 
mistake. As Dennett states of the issue: 
 
What we may tend to overlook...is the possibility 
that we are subtracting, on one path, the very 
thing we are seeking [ie. the correct explanation 
of non-human animal behaviour] on the other.20  
                                                          
18 Such a stance is said to be anthropocentric (as opposed to anthropomorphic) because 
it preferences the human perspective and experience over any other perspective or 
experience, namely that of non-human animals. In this case, the implication of the 
anthropocentric viewpoint is that only what humans have experienced as a belief or 
intention can be recognised as such. If the experience of a non-human animal is so alien 
to us that we cannot discern its beliefs or intentions, the anthropocentric philosopher (if 
one will permit what I see to be a gross contradiction in terms) will conclude that the 
animal in question is not an intentional being as all. They do so because they are 
looking for a distinctly human type of belief or intention.  
19 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.128.  
 




As for anthropocentrism, this is a problem which needs to be overcome 
even by those championing the existence of consciousness in non-
human animals. A case in point is Tom Regan’s discussion, in which he 
effectively divides animals into two distinct and mutually exclusive 
groups21: humans and non-human animals.22  This approach is useful to 
some extent, but it tends to render invisible or even insignificant the 
differences between animal species in relation to the intentionality 
debate. It may well be that some animals have beliefs and intentions, 
whilst others do not. Such a possibility is denied in Regan’s sweeping 
statement that ‘even if primates show that they are able to use a 
language [and thereby show that they have beliefs and intentions], they 
would prove to be the exception rather than the rule’.23 This quotation 
illustrates the dangers of  the anthropocentric tendency to group a large 
variety of animals together when it comes to intentionality. It leads to an 
‘all-or-nothing’ stance, embodied in the view that all animals (except for 
humans, which are noticeably absent from this group) have beliefs or 
intentions, or none of them do. 
 
If we are to attribute beliefs and intentions to non-human animals, we 
must avoid an anthropocentric stance. However, we must not confuse 
anthropocentrism with anthropomorphism. To dismiss 
anthropomorphism completely may be (to borrow a phrase from Stitch), 
‘to throw out the baby with the bathwater’.24  Ideally, we need to tread 
the very fine line between the insights which emerge from the so-called 
‘anthropomorphic’ approach on one hand, and the biases of 








And now, we meet quite often, 
Those empty pants and I, 
And we never shake or tremble 
                                                                                                                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 This division is usually taken for granted as fact in the intentionality debate, as is 
reflected in the approach to this very article.  
22 See especially T. Regan, The Case For Animal Rights (University of California Press, 
Los Angeles, 1983), pp.66-7. 
23 Ibid., p.39. 
24 S. Stitch, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge 




We both smile  
And we say 
“Hi!”25  
 
At the end of Dr Seuss’s tale, GP and Everyperson establish verbal 
communication, being fortunate enough to both use language, and the 
same language at that. Language is a medium we use to establish 
whether or not beliefs and intentions can be attributed to another being. 
If I say ‘I am going to put the cat outside because I think he wants to go 
to the toilet’, (assuming we are in the same language community), you 
can make sense of my behaviour immediately, and you might then 
hesitate to bring the cat back inside immediately, even if you desire to. If 
you are not sure about what beliefs and intentions are behind my 
behaviour, you can simply ask me and I can give a detailed verbal 
response. 
 
Of course, I can always lie to you. Or it may be the case that I am unable 
to articulate something, or even that what I do say is misinterpreted. But 
by and large, we can say that it is very likely that a human being uses 
language to express a desire or an intention, even if to deceive. From this 
we can infer that a person who uses language is an intentional being.26  
 
In this account, I have presented language as a medium for the 
articulation of pre-established beliefs and desires. These may still be 
present if language is not - it is simply more difficult to ascertain their 
presence in this case. However, some philosophers and scientists have 
argued that language facilitates the construction of beliefs and desires, 
and without it, no being can be said to be intentional at all.27  
 
Even when we take for granted the assumption inherent in this 
argument, that non-human animals do not use language, the argument 
remains problematic. Firstly, such an argument assumes that language 
precedes beliefs and intentions. If this is the case we cannot explain how 
human babies, as non-linguistic beings, make the transition to 
linguistically proficient beings, because we cannot argue that these 
babies learn by believing that words resemble particular concepts.28  But 
we DO know that young children  learn language, and that before doing 
                                                          
25 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of’? 
26 I will leave out a discussion of the philosophical creature, the Zombie, who exists for 
the purpose of undermining this conclusion. I feel that Dennett deals with Zombies 
very well in Consciousness Explained, 1991.  
27 See D. Davidson, ‘Rational Animals’ Dialectics, 36/4 (1982) and Stitch, ‘From Folk 
Psychology to Cognitive Science’ for arguments of this type.  
28 This point is also made in Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.44. 
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so, must rely on a selection of non-verbal behaviour (such as crying at 
the sight of a dog; laughing, smiling and waving one’s arms about when 
mum opens the refrigerator etc) in order to express beliefs and desires. 
Experience teaches us that beliefs and language must be distinct in order 
for the former to precede the latter. 
 
Secondly, by arguing that language is a necessary condition for 
intentionality, we risk identifying particular linguistic constructions 
with certain beliefs. An example of such a position is given by R.G. Frey, 
as discussed by Regan: 
 
According to Frey, animals lack beliefs because 
what is believed (the object of belief) is that a given sentence is 
true; and since animals lack 
linguistic proficiency, they cannot believe that 
any sentence is true. That being so, they cannot 
believe anything and so, given that beliefs are 
necessary for desires, they cannot desire anything.29  
 
The type of argument put forward by Frey and others leads to 
‘paradoxes of intentionality’,30  which occur when belief tokens are 
confused with belief types, or vice-versa. According to Frey’s logic, Fido 
the dog cannot be said to believe that the cat is up tree X, unless he 
believes ‘Lambie [or the name or some other representation of the cat in 
question] is up tree X’, or something almost word-for-word similar. 
 
Such an argument seems preposterously strong: it not only excludes 
non-human animals, but also non-English speaking humans, young 
children and anyone else who is unable, for whatever reason, to 
formulate such a sentence. If we admit that these beings can believe 
something is true without possessing the token or sentence for that 
belief, then we must allow that possessing a particular belief-token 
cannot be a necessary criterion for having a belief. Regan extends this 
objection to argue that if a belief-type cannot be reduced to a belief-
token, it makes no sense to claim that belief is constituted by a token.31  
 
Philosophers such as Davidson, Stitch and Frey, in holding that 
language is an essential criterion in attributing intentionality to other 
beings, seem to overestimate the role played by language in moulding 
beliefs. But language and beliefs are different things. This is evident at 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p.39.  
30 This phrase is one of Copeland’s. For further discussion, see Copeland, ‘Artificial 
Intelligence’, pp.199-200. 




times when we are aware that language is inadequate for our purposes, 
and we must communicate our beliefs and desires as best we can. It is 
also evident at other times, we find that expressing a belief or desire 
verbally can clarify it for us.32  The tension between language on the one 
hand and our beliefs, desires and intentions on the other supports the 
notion that these are separate and distinct faculties, even if they do 
usually function interdependently. 
 
Those who adopt the position that language is necessary for 
intentionality often assume that non-human animals do not have 
language. Such an assumption discounts the possibility of non-verbal 
communication, which, although not as complex as a verbal language, 
indicates the presence of beliefs and desires. If the argument about 
language is based on the premise that human language is the only way 
we can ascertain the presence of second-order beliefs (assuming, for the 
moment, that these are a necessary condition for intentionality), it does 
not follow that a lack of verbal language signifies a definite lack in 
second-order beliefs.33  
 
Another objection to this argument is the controversial point that 
several studies have shown the ability of non-human animals to use 
human languages such as sign language.34 These studies and others like 
them consistently undermine the assumption that language is an 
exclusively human faculty. If it is through language that second-order 
beliefs emerge, we must, in the light of these experiments, acknowledge 
that second-order beliefs can be attributed, at least to the non-human 
animals who have so far successfully demonstrated some degree of 
linguistic competence. 
 
The subject of non-human animal communication is one which is highly 
controversial, partly because there is no clear-cut method of 
distinguishing those instances of animal behaviour which constitute an 
act of communication from those which are not intended to 
communicate anything. This is another difficulty arising from the 
human position.  
 
                                                          
32 Dennett draws attention to this matter in The Intentional Stance: ‘Language enables us 
to formulate highly specific desires, but it also forces us on occasion to commit 
ourselves to desires altogether more stringent in their conditions of satisfaction than 
anything we would otherwise have any reason to endeavour to satisfy’.(p.20).  
33 See Part 1. 
34 An exposition of such studies is beyond the scope of this article. See for instrance the 
work of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, or discussion in The Great Ape Project, ed. P. Singer 
and P. Caveleiri (Fourth Estate Publishers, London, 1993). 
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It is perhaps for this reason that the major studies pertaining to non-
human animal communication have all been based on the view that an 
animal has language if it has the ability to adopt human language. The 
view that non-human animals may have a language limited to their 
species does not seem to constitute, in the eyes of scientists, sufficient 
evidence that they use language.35  
 
However, one can object that basing judgements about the linguistic 
faculty of non-human animals on their ability to use human language is 
a very anthropocentric view. As with the arguments about rationality, 
this ‘language’ criterion seems to demand much more for non-human 







But then a strange thing happened. 
Why, those pants began to cry! 
Those pants began to tremble. 
They were just as scared as I!37  
 
The above stanza captures Everyperson’s act of applying the intentional 
stance perfectly. She observes GP’s behaviour, assumes that GP must be 
similar to her, and infers beliefs and intentions from GP’s behaviour 
based on this similarity. Of course, the interpretation that GP is scared is 
made after Everyperson’s previous - and incorrect - interpretation 
resulting in the conclusion that GP’s beliefs and desires are malignant.38  
 
                                                          
35 For example, see Regan, ‘The Case For Animal Rights’.  
36 In Savage-Rumbaugh’s work, Bonobo Chimpanzees are expected not only to learn a 
language, but to communicate in a variety of ways which they are not used to (such as 
communicating via an electronic keypad). We expect the Bonobos to learn new 
behaviours as well as an entirely new language. On the human scale, this would be like 
asking of human subjects that they learn and adopt the principles of echolocation using 
squeals instead of words. While such an experiment can teach us a lot about the way 
human beings learn, it does not necessarily lend decisive insight into our linguistic 
abilities.  
37 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ 
38 One can argue that Everyperson is still justified in applying the intentional stance, as 
she was correct in assuming that GP was trying to run to her. It may in fact be the 
precision of Everyperson’s judgements that are the grounds for the errors: Everyperson 
expects too much of the intentional stance, just as Dennett shows we expect to know 
too much about the intentions of a Frog in order to judge whether it is being rational or 




A possible solution to the problem of ascribing beliefs and intentions to 
non-human animals which avoids the pitfalls of adopting the intentional 
stance is simple: do not attribute beliefs and intentions at all. In spite of 
the fact that such a view is counter-intuitive, it has been taken up by 
many scientists as if it were an established truth. This dogmatism, as 
Griffin39 terms it, is widely known as ‘behaviourism’. Though 
outmoded in relation to humans, ‘the behaviouristic viewpoint has been 
accepted, implicitly, if not explicitly, by most ethologists studying 
animal behaviour’.40  
 
The behaviourist doctrine, in relation to animals, holds that the 
intentional explanations of non-human animal behaviour are human 
constructions which have no basis in fact whatsoever; instead, all 
behaviour is in response to ‘independent variables’ or environmental 
stimuli only (including the chemical and neural environment of the 
brain and body).41 Thus behaviourists attempt to account for animal 
behaviour in terms of environmental histories and/or chemical analysis 
of brain states. 
 
A problem with the behaviourist position is that it is very limited 
because it requires the study of complex behavioural histories. Heyes 
and Dickinson adopt a behaviourist approach in experiments designed 
to determine the presence of animal beliefs. They emphasise the impact 
of the environment on animal behaviour, as can be seen in the following 
passage: 
 
Our analysis suggests that in order to find out 
whether any given example of animal action is 
intentional it is essential to measure the effects on 
that action of changes in the animal’s environment 
which could be expected to alter the content of  
the animal’s mental states .42  
 
I have emphasised what I believe to be the key element of this passage, 
which highlights the interpretive function of behaviourism. This 
passage thus allows us to see that the criticism that adopting the 
intentional stance is based on mere interpretation and speculation can also 
be leveled at behaviourists. 
                                                          
39 See D. Griffin, Animal Thinking (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1984), pp.18-24.  
40 Ibid., p.19.  
41 In explaining the doctrine of behaviourism I have made use of the entry on the 
aforementioned from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p.67. 
42 C. Heyes and A. Dickinson, ‘The Intentionality of Animal Action’, Mind & Language, 
5/1, (1990), p.94 - emphasis added. 
 




In predicting animal behaviour, the intentional stance has the advantage 
over behaviourism: the former is quicker and less complicated than the 
latter. Furthermore, the behaviourist, without recourse to a mind, runs 
into problems when trying to  explain the faculty of memory in non-
human animals, or prima facie random behaviour. Overall,  assuming 
beliefs and intentions in animals seems to ‘fit’ the picture altogether 
better than behaviourism, which Griffin rejects outright, ‘not so much 
because it belittles the value of living animals, but because it leads to a 
seriously incomplete and hence misleading picture of reality’.43  
 
It has been argued by others that the intentional stance cannot be 
discarded in favour of behaviourism, because the latter is simply a 
redescription strategy, which attempts to draw the same conclusions as 
would be drawn from the intentional stance, by simply employing a 
more dense vocabulary. Routley makes this point, arguing that 
 
each new redescription, obtained for instance by 
iteration of “something like”, is in turn intentional, 
and requires itself elimination - not to say 
explanation (unless “something like...something 
like belief” collapses back to the problematic 
“something like belief”).44  
 
The point is that, in the end, we are no nearer to possessing a self-
standing, complete explanation of behaviour even if we adopt the 
behaviourist stance. Instead, we end up with an infinite regress of 
intentional explanations. 
 
Those who would hold a behaviourist view of non-human animals and 
deny the same for humans are in a tenuous position. Given our 
similarities with non-human animals (illustrated by the fact that the 
intentional stance often does work in predicting the behaviour of non-
human animals), it seems unreasonable to assume that intentionality can 
actually be applied to humans if it cannot also be applied to non-human 
animals. Griffin expresses this point beautifully: 
 
Accepting the reality of our evolutionary 
relationship to other animals, it is unparsimonious 
to assume a rigid dichotomy of interpretation 
which insists that mental experiences have some 
                                                          
43 D. Griffin, Animal Thinking, (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1984), p.24. 
44 R. Routley, ‘Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs and Intentionality to Animals’, 




effect on the behaviour of one species of animals 
but none at all on others.45  
 
Thus if we assume the behaviourist position, we can see that the 
problem in not attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human animals 
bleeds into the problem of attributing beliefs and intentions to any 







I put my arm around their waist 
And sat right down beside them. 
I calmed them down, 
 Poor empty pants 
 With nobody inside them.46  
 
Having recognised GP’s status as an intentional being, Everyperson 
shows consideration for the feelings and well-being of GP. In this stanza 
it is evident that whether or how we attribute beliefs and intentions to 
non-human animals is directly related to certain ethical considerations 
about our interactions with non-human animals. The standard 
‘scientific’ viewpoint is that non-human animals are not intentional 
beings, and that they are therefore not within our sphere of moral 
concern. This view is espoused by Carruthers, who concludes that  
 
the arguments of Regan and Singer for extending 
the principle of equal consideration of interests to animals...were 
in any case founded on a false 
premise. For both assume that animal desires and 
animal experiences are relevantly similar to our 
own - in particular, that they are conscious ones.47  
 
If Carruthers’ argument is correct, and animals are not ‘appropriate 
objects of moral concern’,48  we may be able to perform animal 
experiments or practise factory farming without overstepping any 
moral boundaries. The fact that our current practices relating to non-
human animals operate without considering non-human animal 
                                                          
45 As quoted in Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.35. 
46 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ 
47 Carruthers, ‘The Animals Issue’, p.191. 
48 Ibid., p.193. 
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interests as equal to our own would seem to indicate that the above 
view is held by many people in, if not most members of, our society. 
 
Such established practices and customs cannot be taken lightly, and 
have an inestimable influence on philosophical or scientific 
investigations into the subject of non-human animal intentionality. One 
of the problems, then, in attributing beliefs and intentionality to non-
human animals may be that to do so would be to acknowledge that non-
human animals are worthy of moral consideration, which would almost 
definitely entail the cessation of the aforementioned practices. The 
reluctance of people to attribute intentionality to non-human animals 
may therefore have more to do with  a desire to continue current 
practises involving animals than it has to do with the quality or indeed 
the quantity of the evidence for or against non-human animal 
intentionality. 
 
The question which Carruthers and other proponents of this view fail to 
address adequately is whether or not moral consideration of other 
beings should hinge on the attribution of beliefs and intentions by us. If 
we answer that it should, we have yet to gather conclusive evidence that 
non-human animals are or are  not intentional beings. But it is also 
possible that we can include non-human animals in our moral sphere, 
even if we cannot determine whether a being is intentional or not. For 
instance, it is certainly possible to imagine that pain behaviour exhibited 
by a slug (I choose a slug for my example because a slug is a less-likely 
candidate for intentionality) writhing in salt is indicative of genuine 
suffering, even if we are not willing to attribute belief and intentions, as 
we know them, to such a creature. 
 
Surely, when possible beings of moral concern are in question, it is 
pertinent to err on the side of caution rather than to jump to conclusions 
which, if it were discovered that non-human animals were intentional 
beings worthy of our moral consideration, would have done 







I have argued that there are several problems inherent in the intentional 
stance, arising from the potential anthropocentrism and 




particularly emphasise the fact that a major problem in attributing 
beliefs and intentions to non-human animals lies in the type of 
assumptions inherent in the typical intentional stance. I have shown that 
these assumptions, such as that of rationality and of the faculty of 
language, lead to conditions which may be too stringent in the case of 
non-human animals, whereas weaker indications of such would be 
enough to satisfy criteria for attributing beliefs and intentions to 
humans. 
 
On the other hand, there are equally problems if we choose not to 
attribute intentionality to non-human animals, and these in fact cause 
more problems than adopting the intentional stance in the first place. As 
my discussion of behaviourism in Part V illustrates, the grounds for 
attributing beliefs and intentions to humans are undermined if we do 
not acknowledge the presence of such in non-human animals. In light of 
this point, a tenuous position such as  animal behaviourism is more 
likely to be adopted toward non-human animals only, in order to avoid 
facing the possibility of having to treat non-human animals as objects of 
moral concern. 
 
Nonetheless, because it is so accessible and relatively reliable, most of us 
cannot avoid adopting - at one stage or another - the intentional stance 
toward another being. However, just as Everyperson’s experience 
illustrates, such a stance is fallible. To draw any reliable conclusions the 
stance must not be applied without consideration of contingencies, 
differences between the non-human animals in question and ourselves, 
and other variables. It is of too much value to be dismissed. And there 
remains the possibility that, for all of our scientific studies, the 
intentional stance (applied cautiously) may remain the best way to 
understand and predict the behaviour of non-human animals. This final 
point, I believe, is one which Thomas Nagel has been making all along. 
In his words: 
 
There are things about the world and life and 
ourselves that cannot be adequately understood 
from a maximally objective standpoint, however 
much it may extend our understanding beyond the 
point from which we started. A great deal is 
essentially connected to a particular point of view, 
or type of point of view, and the attempt to give a  
complete account of the world in objective terms  
detached from these perspectives inevitably leads  
to false reductions or outright denial that certain  
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